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1.  Introduction 
The Uruguay round established a global agreement on intellectual property, which is 
called TRIPS (Traded-related aspects of intellectual property rights). Under this agreement, most 
developing countries should introduce the international minimum standards of protection by this 
year (2006).  A recent debate in the WTO (World Trade Organization) meeting has been whether 
it is desirable to extend IPR protection to the least developed countries.  The declaration in the 
Doha round extends the deadline for the least developed countries to introduce patent protection 
on pharmaceuticals until 2016. This proposal seems reasonable since the least developed 
countries do not have the capacity to absorb new knowledge from the innovations while they 
desperately need the products developed by northern firms.   
A number of papers deal with the issue of IPR protection in terms of North-South trade. 
Chin and Grossman (1988) use a duopoly model to compare the welfare effects of IPR protection 
between two regimes: ‘full IPR protection’ and ‘no IPR protection’. They show that the 
economic interests of the North and the South are generally in conflict in the sense that ‘no IPR 
protection’ benefits the South while it hurts the North. Diwan and Rodrik (1991) argue northern 
and southern countries generally have different preferences for technology. They model the 
‘appropriate technology’ for southern countries, and suggest that southern countries benefit from 
IPR protection. Deardorff (1992) argues that, when IPR protection increases, the North is always 
benefited while the South is hurt, and emphasizes that the effect on world welfare will be 
negative if IPR protection is extended to all southern countries. Helpman (1993) suggests that 
tightening IPR protection hurts both North and South in the presence of slow imitation while it 
benefits only the North when the imitation rate is high. He also points out that higher protection 
of IPR by the South could lead to slow innovation of northern firms, partly because of the lack of 
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competition. Grossman and Lai (2004) develop a dynamic model in which ongoing innovation 
occurs in both the North and the South.  Among their many findings are that, under given 
conditions, patent protection in an open economy Nash equilibrium will be less than in the closed 
economy equilibrium and that the larger, more productive North will choose larger protection of 
IPR then will the South.  They also find that overall world welfare depends on a world index of 
patent protection, where the index weights the patent protection in each country by country size.     
              Žigić (1998) extends Chin and Grossman’s model by introducing technological 
spillovers to examine the role of IPR protection when only the northern firm conducts innovative 
activity. The degree of spillovers is interpreted as an indicator of the inverse strength of IPR 
protection. He shows that the South may benefit from tightening IPR protection through the 
spillover effect of the increased northern firm’s R&D investment; however, by considering only 
one Southern firm he effectively assumes all southern countries will have the same spillover rate.  
In a subsequent paper, Zigic (2000), using a similar two country model, analyzes a four stage 
game in which the Southern country chooses its level of IPR protection, and the Northern 
country (where all output is sold) uses an import tariff not only for strategic reasons, but also 
because of its impact on R&D.  Yang (1998) shows, using a partial equilibrium model, that both 
the North and the South would be better off if some southern countries impose more IPR 
protection while the others impose less. However, he does not identify which southern countries 
should provide more IPR protection for the northern technology.1  McCalman (2001), explicitly 
noting the large heterogeneity in countries’ enforcement of IPRs, estimates the welfare and 
transfer effects of harmonizing these standards.    
By considering only one southern country and a common spillover parameter, Zigic 
ignores the fact that the southern countries may face different spillovers. In Levin et al. (1987) 
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and Cohen and Levinthal (1989), firms may be different in their abilities to absorb or assimilate 
intra-industry spillovers.2  We extend Žigić (1998) by introducing different spillovers among 
southern countries to examine welfare effects of IPR protection. Only the northern country 
innovates, and n-1 southern countries have different capacities to absorb knowledge spillovers 
from the northern innovations.3 We assume, as in Žigić, the abilities to absorb spillovers in any 
southern country decrease (increase) when IPR protection is tightened (relaxed). A two-stage 
game is considered. In the first stage, the northern firm invests in R&D to create the new process. 
The outcome of innovations reduces the unit production cost of the northern firm. The 
technology developed by the northern firm provides benefits to the southern firms through 
spillovers. The degree of spillovers is different across southern firms, depending on their ability 
to realize knowledge spillovers. In the second stage, all firms engage in Cournot competition. 
In this paper, we investigate the welfare effects of spillovers (or IPR protection), and 
discuss the conflicts between the North and the South. The global welfare effects of spillovers 
are also examined.  We consider optimal IPR policy from a southern perspective, when countries 
act non-cooperatively and when they can collectively agree on policy.   We find that more 
efficient southern countries prefer a tighter collective IPR policy then do less efficient Southern 
countries. However, from a world welfare perspective it is better for the more efficient countries 
to expand their spillover. This implies that private and social incentives may not be coordinated. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and identifies the 
equilibrium while section 3 provides comparative static analysis. Section 4 investigates the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 This is because he assumes that all southern countries are identical. 
2 Cohen and Levinthal (1989) calls this ability ‘absorptive capacity’. 
3 In terms of the North, the issue of IPR protection may be ‘imitation’ of southern countries rather than spillovers. 
Usually, ‘imitation’ and ‘spillovers’ are interpreted differently in the sense that ‘imitation’ is costly while 
‘spillovers’ are costless. By different capacity to absorb spillovers, however, we are implicitly considering costly 
spillovers. Thus, the terms ‘imitation’ and ‘spillovers’ are interchangeable in this paper even though we prefer 
‘spillovers’, following Žigić.    
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welfare effects of spillovers and of optimal southern policy. The last section provides 
conclusions. 
 
2. The Model and Solution 
There are n countries in the world market: one northern country (labeled by 1) and n-1 
southern countries (labeled 2,3,.,n). Each country has only one firm. All innovations take place in 
the northern country, which conducts R&D. Through a spillover effect, n-1 southern countries 
can partly appropriate the knowledge generated by the northern country, depending on their 
knowledge absorptive abilities and their IPR policy and enforcement. Both North and South have 
access to an old technology to produce a good demanded in the world market.  
              The northern firm has the following unit production cost function, which is the one used 
by Chin and Grossman (1988):  ( )1 21 1c α γχ= − , where 1α  describes pre-innovation cost in the 
north, and γ is a parameter denoting R&D efficiency. The term ( )1 2γχ  is the R&D production 
function, which exhibits diminishing returns with respect to R&D investment, χ .4  The 
ith southern firm’s unit cost function is: ( )1 2i i ic xα β γ= − , ni ,....,3,2=  where iα  reflects the 
intrinsic cost heterogeneity across countries and )1,0(∈β i  denotes the spillover, or the strength 
of inverse IPR protection, as in Žigić (1998).  The spillover parameter is determined by two 
factors: the IPR protection policy and a country-specific learning characteristic. The country-
specific characteristic may reflect the country’s imitation ability to absorb R&D knowledge,5 or 
the extent to which the innovation is appropriate for the technological conditions of the particular 
                                                          
4 For more detail, see D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). 
5 Cohen and Levinthal (1989) call this ability ‘absorptive capacity’.   
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southern country6.  Even if southern countries adopt a common IPR protection level, the actual 
spillover may differ across countries, depending on their ability to use the R&D knowledge7. 
Without loss of generality, we order the countries such that: 1 2 3 ... nα α α α< < < < .  Note 
that 11 ≡β  in our set-up and 1iβ ≤  for all i, with strict inequality if spillovers are not complete.  
Consumers are assumed identical, and country i’s consumers consume [0,1]iθ ∈  proportion of 
total demand, which is given as a linear inverse demand function: QAP −= , qQ i∑= .     
 The game among n firms consists of two stages, and we use the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. In the first stage, the northern firm chooses R&D investment, χ . In the second stage, 
given the R&D investment, the n firms engage in Cournot-Nash competition.  We first solve for 
the Nash equilibrium in the second stage and then work backwards to solve for the first stage 
R&D level.  In the second stage, each firm maximizes its profit, which is given as:  
   ( ) ( )( )i i i i i iP Q q c q A Q c qπ = − = − −      1,...,i n∀ =   
1
n
i
i
Q q
=
≡∑  (1) 
The first order condition for each firm (country) is: 
 ( ) ( ) 0, 1,...,i i i id dq P c q i nπ = − − = =  (2)  
 Summing (2) across all firms, and assuming an interior solution for each firm yields: 
( )
( ) ( )
1 21 1 1
1
0 ; ; ;
1
N N N
i i iN
i i i
i
i
cA Nc
NP c Q P c
N N N N
α β
α β γχ α β= = =
=
+− − = → = ≡ = − ≡ ≡+
∑ ∑ ∑∑  (3)  
 This solution has the well-known property that, under constant marginal costs, aggregate 
                                                          
6 For example, the innovation may be labor-saving, and hence would reduce costs proportionately more in imitating 
countries with cost conditions most similar to those in the north (i.e., relatively high wage-rental ratios).   
7 The spillover parameter depends on the country’s innate ability to use the knowledge ( )iω , and its (inverse) IPR 
protection policy, iρ  which includes IPR law and enforcement policy.  Letting 0iρ =  be “perfect” IPR protection, 
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equilibrium price and quantity depend on the number of firms and average cost per firm, but not 
on the distribution of the cost vectors ( ) ( ){ }1 1,..., , ,...,N Nα α β β .  For future reference, define: 
 ( ) ( );i i i iε α α ς β β≡ − = −  (4) 
so that ( ),i iε ς represent the deviation of a firm’s cost function from the industry average.  The 
deviations are defined so that positive values for each correspond to higher than average costs.  
Using (2) and (3) yields:    
 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
2* * *
1
1 2 1 2
* *
1 1
; ;
1
;
1 1
T n
i i T
i i i i
i
T T
A n n
q q n
n
n A A n
Q P
n n
α ε β β γχ π β β β
α β γχ α β γχ
=
− − + + + −= = ≡ =+
− + + −= =+ +
∑
 (5) 
where the “*” indicates the equilibrium value.   
 In the first stage, given the second stage outcome, the northern firm chooses χ to 
maximize its profit (including R&D cost):  
 
( ) ( ) *** * *1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
; 1 0i
i
dqdV dq dcV P c q P q P c q P q
d d d d
χ χ χ χ χ≠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞′ ′= − − = + − + − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑  (6) 
The first term on the RHS vanishes by the envelope theorem, whereas the last term reflects the 
impact of R&D expenditures on firm 1’s total costs.  The middle term represents the strategic 
aspect of the firm’s decision, which arises only because R&D decisions are made before output 
decisions.  From (5) it is readily seen that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )( )
( )
1 2
1 2*
1
1
1 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
T
Ti
ii
i
n n ndq
d n n
β β γ χ β γ χ
χ
≠
≠
⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟ − +⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠= =⎜ ⎟ + +⎝ ⎠
∑∑  (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and 1iρ =  no protection, define: ( ), ,i i igβ ω ρ= with 0, 0g gω ρ≥ ≥ .  Two countries with the same level of 
(incomplete) IPR protection would have different effective spillovers if they had different iω  .   
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The sign of (7) depends on Tβ , and hence the strategic interaction can increase or decrease firm 
1’s investment in R&D.  If ( )( )1 2T nβ > + , this interaction reduces the firm’s investment in 
R&D, meaning that further R&D investment by firm 1 would lower its total costs but also lower 
profits due to the output effect on other firms.8  Using (5) and (7) in (6) and simplifying yields: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )( )
1 2*
1
1
1
1 0
1
Tq n
dV d
n
β γ χχ + −= − =+  (8)  
It is readily seen that the second order condition holds.  Solving (8), using (5), yields: 
 
( )( )2 21*
2
1A n
D
γ α εχ − − + Δ=  where  1 1;Tn βΔ ≡ + − ≥  ( )2 21D n γ⎡ ⎤≡ + − Δ⎣ ⎦  (9) 
A meaningful solution requires 0D > 9.  For future reference, rewrite this condition as: 
 ( ) ( )( )221 1 1 0D n γ β= + − − >   where:  ( )( ) ( )( )1 , 1 1T n nβ β β≡ + Δ = + −   (10) 
Now, since ( )( )1 1 ,1nβ ⎡ ⎤∈ +⎣ ⎦ , for this condition on D  to hold for all jβ  requires: 
Assumption 1:  ( )( )21n nγ < +  
Using equilibrium R&D in (5) yields equilibrium output levels and price:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1*
1 1
1*
1
1 1 ;
1
i i i i i i
T T
A n
q n
D
A n n n
Q
D
α εφ γ β φ α α ε ε
α γ β ε γ β
− − +⎛ ⎞= − + + − Δ − ≡ − = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− + − Δ − − Δ=
 (11) 
Note that, given the intrinsic overall cost structure of the industry (i.e.,α ), the more efficient the 
innovating firm (country) is, the larger will be innovation and overall industry output.  
                                                          
8Naturally, firm 1’s R&D investment is reduced by the presence of other firms.  The strategic term merely shows 
how R&D investment is affected by the fact it is chosen before outputs, rather than simultaneously with outputs.   
9 If ( )2 21n γ+ < Δ  then the optimal R&D is unbounded ( )χ → ∞ .  
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The equilibrium R&D level and aggregate output depend on the aggregate spillover 
( )Tβ , but not on the distribution of spillovers among firms10.  We assume all firms produce 
positive amounts in equilibrium, which implies research productivity, γ , is not too large.11  
It is desirable to compare the condition for the n-firm oligopoly equilibrium to exist in 
our model with the corresponding condition for the duopoly equilibrium to exist both in Chin 
and Grossman (1988) and in Žigić (1998).  These conditions were 3 2γ <  for Chin and 
Grossman and  ( )( ){ }3 1 2γ β β< − −  for  Žigić.  Both papers assumed two countries (n=2, 
Minβ β= ), with identical intrinsic costs ( )0iφ = .  Thus, our condition that output be positive 
(footnote 10) reduces to ( )( ){ }3 1 2γ β β< − − , the same condition as in Žigić.  Furthermore, 
upon setting 0β =  (as in Chin and Grossman) yields their condition for existence.    
Both Chin and Grossman and Žigić consider two more types of equilibria: monopoly 
and strategic predation. They show that the northern firm will enjoy a pure monopoly position 
for a sufficiently high value of the R&D efficiency parameter (γ ) while it will act strategically to 
induce the southern firm’s exit (strategic predation) for an intermediate value of R&D efficiency.  
These two types of equilibria also can exist when there is more than one southern country in the 
world.  The monopoly condition, assuming identical intrinsic costs ( )1i iα α= ∀ , in our set-up is 
1
1 Max
γ β> − , which is the same as the corresponding condition for Žigić  and Chin and 
Grossman (with 0β = ).   Strategic predation, when the innovating firm faces more than one 
                                                          
10Any changes in ( )2 ,..., nβ β  that preserves the sum will not affect firm 1’s R&D effort.   
11 Note that (11) can be rewritten as: ( ) ( ) ( )( )* * *1 11 1i i iq q q nφ γ β= − − Δ − + .  For 0iφ ≡  * 0iq >  implies: 
( ) ( )1 1 Minnγ β⎡ ⎤< + Δ −⎣ ⎦ .  If this condition is to hold for all β , then it is more restrictive then is Assumption 1. 
Also, if intrinsic costs differ across firms, then we must require that these differences not be too large.    
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rival (n>2), is more complicated then in the two country set-up since the threshold levels of 
innovation required for predation depend upon whether the innovating firm is trying to force one 
firm, two firms, or all rival firms from the market.  Even though the outcome comparison among 
these equilibria is an interesting issue, we do not consider these equilibria since we are interested 
in investigating the own and cross welfare effects of spillovers in the southern countries.  
 
3. Comparative statics   
 A change in the “spillover” rate in any southern country has direct and indirect effects.  
The direct impact lowers costs in that country only, improving its competitiveness versus all 
other countries (thereby hurting firms in those other countries).  Since the increased spillover 
lowers the private return to R&D, it causes the Northern firm to reduce R&D expenditures; this, 
in turn, raises costs for all firms but raises costs most for those firms with large spillover rates.  
Thus, the increased spillover in one country will likely harm not only the Northern firm but also 
other firms with high spillover rates but may (will) benefit firms with very low spillover rates. 
 
Proposition 1.  An increased spillover rate in Southern country i reduces the Northern firm’s 
R&D, raises costs for all other firms, but results in lower costs for firm i if its spillover rate is 
sufficiently low. 
Proof. Differentiating (9) yields: 
 ( ) ( )( )
2 2** * *
2 2
12 22 2 0; 0
1i
nd
d D n
γχ γχ χ χ ψβ ψ γ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤Δ + − Δ⎛ ⎞Δ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟≡ − = − < ≡ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟Δ ⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟+ + Δ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 (12)  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )*1 2 1 2 1 2* * **12j jij j ij
i i
dc d
d d
βχγχ δ β γχ γχ δβ β χ ψ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎪ ⎪= − − = − +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎩ ⎭
 (13) 
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where 1ijδ =  if i=j and zero otherwise.  Since R&D falls, the costs of all firms - except firm i - 
must increase.  For j=i,  if iβ  is small enough costs fall.  Formally: 
  ( ) 0i idc dβ >≤  as  iβ ψ>≤         QED (14) 
By construction, 1Δ > ; thus, for γ  sufficiently small, the inequality ( )iβ ψ<  in (14) will be 
satisfied for all southern countries.  Since ψ  is a decreasing function of γ , the larger R&D 
efficacy, the less likely it is that a southern firm will reduce its costs by increasing its spillover.     
Since the value of ψ  recurs below, it is worthwhile simplifying the expression.  Define: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )221 111 , ;1 1 1n m mnm n n m γβ ψ γ γ
⎛ ⎞+ −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟≡ − ∈ ≡⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟+ + +⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
     (15) 
Turning to the impact of increased spillovers on that firm’s output, it is clear its output 
will increase if its unit production costs fall.  However, since the costs of all other firms must 
increase, it is possible for a firm’s output to increase even if its production costs rise; clearly, 
what matters is how much its costs increase compared to the average cost increase for all firms.  
It is also possible that the output of a “low-spillover” firm will increase, even though it has not 
increased its own spillover rate.  By the same logic, aggregate output could increase if both the 
productivity of R&D investment and the aggregate spillover rate are low.  Formally, from (5): 
 ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )1 2* 1
1 1
1
T
jj
ij
i
ndq
n
d n
β βγχ δβ ψ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− +⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟= ⋅ + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (16) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 1 2*
2
1 2 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
T
i i
dQ dP
d d n n
β γ βγχ γχβ
β β ψ β γ β
− − −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−= − = ⋅ + = ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦ − − −
 
   (17) 
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Proposition 2. 
i. The equilibrium output of the firm which increases its spillover rate increases if and 
only if:  ( ) ( )( )1Ti n nβ ψ β< + +  
ii. If the aggregate spillover rate is sufficiently high, the equilibrium output of a low 
spillover firm may increase as a result of some other firm increasing its spillover rate: 
i.e.,   ( )* 0j idq dβ <≥  as ( )( ) ( )( )2 22 1 1 1 1jβ β γ β γ β> ⎡ ⎤≤ − + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   ,  j i≠  
iii. If  R&D investment is not too productive, then for low aggregate spillover rates an 
increase in the spillover rate leads to higher aggregate equilibrium output; i.e.,   
     
( ) ( ) ( )2* 0 1 2 1idQ d asβ γ β β< > ⎡ ⎤≥ ≤ − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   
Note that existence requires ( ) 21γ β −< −  ; hence, condition (iii) must hold for small 
spillover rates.  This implies that over some interval increased spillover rates benefit consumers 
as well as some firms.  Note that for aggregate spillover rates such that ( )1 2β > , then further 
increases in spillover rates must lower aggregate output.   
 
Lemma 1:  If assumption 1 holds, then ( )* 0j jdq dβ > ; that is, an increase in the spillover rate 
by firm j must increase its equilibrium output.   
 
Proof:  See appendix.  
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4. Welfare effects   
              In this section we investigate the effect of a change in spillovers (or IPR protection) on 
global welfare and welfare for each country.  Since, from a global perspective, the original 
equilibrium is inefficient, an increase in some spillover rate can have an ambiguous impact on 
welfare.  The inefficiency of the original equilibrium arises from several sources including: (i) 
given the level of R&D, too little information is shared among countries; (ii) there is 
underinvestment in R&D; (iii) given costs, too little output is produced; and finally (iv) the given 
level of output is produced inefficiently since - under constant costs - all output should be 
produced in the low cost country.  An increase in the spillover rate to some country reduces the 
inefficiency due to (i), exacerbates the inefficiency due to (ii); and - as seen in the previous 
section - has an ambiguous impact on total output (and hence on the inefficiency due to (iii)).   
The welfare of each (Southern) country consists of its firm’s (oligopoly) profits and 
consumer surplus.  Thus, for all countries but the Northern country, welfare is given by:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )*2* * *
0
Q
j j j j
jW CS q P y dy P Q Qπ θ θ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= + = + −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∫  (18) 
where CS  is aggregate consumer surplus, jθ  is country j’s consumer share, and hence jCSθ  is  
consumer surplus in country j.  Profits of the Northern firm, and hence welfare of the Northern 
country, also must reflect the expenditures on R&D: 
 ( ){ } ( ) ( )*21 1 1 * * 1 * *1
0
Q
W CS q P y dy P Q Qπ θ χ θ ⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= + = − + −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∫  (19) 
 Using (18) and (19), we first consider how changes in the spillover rate in country i 
affects each country.  Subsequently, we discuss the likely equilibrium of a game in which 
countries non-cooperatively set their IPR policy, then we consider IPR policy when the South 
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can coordinate its policy choices.  Finally, we consider how differences among southern 
countries will impact optimal IPR policy.  Differentiating (18) with respect to iβ  yields:  
 ( ) * ** *2 ; ;j j j jjj
i i i i i i
dq dq dcdW dP dPq Q
d d d d d d
θβ β β β β β
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (20) 
In (20), ( )*jQθ  represents country j’s consumption ( )jD  of the good.  Rewrite (20) as: 
 ( ) ( )** *; ; 1j j j jj j j j j
i i i i
dc dqdW dPX q P c X q D j
d d d dβ β β β
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + − ≡ − ≠⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (21) 
The first term in (21) represents the standard terms of trade effect: an increase in world price 
benefits (hurts) a country if it is net exporter (net importer).  The second term is the benefit (cost) 
to the country, given output, due to the exogenous change in unit production costs, while the 
third term reflects the change in monopoly profits - at given price -due to the change in the firm’s 
output level.  For the case in which all output is consumed in the North, the impact of increased 
spillover in country i on the welfare of any Southern country j is uniquely determined by the 
change in output in that country.  Hence, it follows from Proposition 2 and Lemma 1:   
 
Proposition 3: Consider an increase in the spillover rate in southern country i.  Assuming all 
output is consumed in the North and Assumption 1 holds, then:  
i. Welfare will increase in country i.   
ii. If the overall spillover rate is not too large ( )( )1 2β < , and R&D efficiency is 
sufficiently low ( ( ) ( )( )21 2 1γ β β< − −  ), then the increased spillover rate in country 
i causes world price to fall and harms all other southern countries. 
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iii. If R&D efficiency is sufficiently high  ( ( ) ( )( )21 2 1γ β β> − −  ), so the increased 
spillover rate in i causes world price to rise, southern countries with low spillover 
rates may benefit from the increased spillover rate in a different southern country. 
iv. Aggregate consumer surplus increases if and only if: ( )* 0,idQ dβ >  i.e., if and only 
if ( ) ( )( )21 2 1γ β β< − −  . 
v. The profits of the Northern firm decrease. 
vi. At least one country must be hurt by the change in iβ . 
 
Proof:  Claims i-iv of the proposition follow directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma 1.  Note 
that aggregate consumer surplus is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )** * * *
0
2 ,
Q
CS Q P y dy P Q Q Q= − =∫  ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
*
2
1 2 1
1 1 1 1i
HdCS Q
d n
γ β γ β
β β γ β
⎛ ⎞Δ − − −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
   (22) 
In (22) we define: ( )( )11H A nα ε≡ − − + .  For part v, the profits of the northern firm are: 
2 *
1 1 ;qπ χ= −   hence:  
2
1 1
1 22 2 0
i i i
d dq d Hq
d d d D
π χ γ
β β β
Δ= − = − <   (23) 
In the above equations, we have used (12) and (16) to simplify the expressions.  For part vi, note 
that if price increases, then the north has to be hurt (consumer surplus falls, profits fall), while if 
price decreases then southern countries with unchanged spillover rates are hurt.  QED 
 
Note that while intrinsic cost differences across firms affect the magnitude of how increased 
spillovers affect any firm (country), they will not alter the sign of this affect.  Thus, absent 
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domestic consumption, the (qualitative) incentives for increasing spillovers will be the same for 
all southern countries.  An immediate corollary to Proposition 3, due to part i, is: 
 
Corollary 3.1:  Suppose all output is exported to the north.  Then in a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium in which Southern countries commit to their IPR policy (spillover rate) prior to the 
northern firm’s R&D choice, all southern countries will choose no IPR protection (i.e., will 
choose their maximum possible spillover rate). 
 
 Thus, in this equilibrium, the only thing that constrains southern firms from having 
complete spillovers ( )1iβ =  is their own ability to adopt the northern innovation as well as the 
extent to which the innovation is appropriate for their local cost conditions12.  If southern 
countries consume, as well as produce, the good then their incentives to protect IPR change.  If 
other southern countries have high spillover rates, then country i knows that increases in its own 
spillover rate must raise world price which, while helping its firms, hurts its consumers.  Hence, 
local demand – as well as intrinsic cost differences – will affect the spillover choices (IPR 
decisions) of each southern country.   
 The fact that any southern country gains, ceteris paribus, from relaxing its own IPR laws 
does not imply that they collectively gain.  Specifically, one could ask what the optimal policy –
from the perspective of southern countries - would be if they could commit to a common IPR 
policy.    Following the suggestion in footnote 7, suppose the spillover in country i is: 
 i i iβ ω ρ= ;     ( )
2
1 ; 1
n
T T T
i
i
nω ω β ω ρ
=
= ≤ − = +∑  (24) 
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In (24) [ ]0,1iρ ∈  represents IPR policy in country i ( 0iρ =  representing comprehensive IPR 
protection), while ( ]0,1iω ∈  represents country-specific factors, such as imitation ability, the 
appropriateness of the Northern innovation for Southern cost conditions, and so forth.  Assuming 
a common IPR policy entails setting iρ ρ= for all i, which still allows for ex post spillover 
differences.  Under this common policy, and using (11) we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )3* 22 1 21 1 1 11 1
T T
i
i i i
H ndq mm m m
d D n n
γ ω ωγ ω β γ βρ
⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫+ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= − + − − − −⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ + +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠
     (25) 
Equation (25) can be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 2 221 11 1 ; 11
T
Ti i i
i iT
H ndq mm m n
d D n
γ ω κ ρ κγ γ κ ω ωρ ω
⎛ ⎞+ ⎧ − ⎫⎡ ⎤= + + − ≡ + −⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠
   (26) 
From (26) the following can be deduced: 
 
Proposition 4.  Suppose southern countries export all output to the North, and assume they can 
coordinate their IPR policy.  Then: 
i. If all southern countries have the same imitation ability, ω , and if ( )1 2ω ≤ , then their 
optimal policy is to provide no IPR protection ( )* 1ρ = . 
ii. If there are more than 3 southern countries, if they all have the same imitation ability, ω , 
and if it is sufficiently large ( ) ( )( )( )* 3 1 4 1n nω ω ⎡ ⎤≥ ≡ − −⎣ ⎦ , then their optimal 
cooperative policy is to provide some IPR protection ( )* 1ρ <  and all southern countries 
are better off than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12If technology is Leontief and the northern innovation economizes on labor, the innovation will lower costs more in 
high wage countries than in low wage countries.  Hence, the ex post heterogeneity in the iβ  is due to the 
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iii. If southern countries differ, then - in coordinating policy - the southern countries whose 
imitation ability is above average will prefer tighter IPR policy (smaller ρ ) then will the 
countries whose imitation  ability is below average.  
PROOF: 
If { }2,...,i i nω ω= ∀ ∈  then 2iκ ω=  and  ( )1 iκ ρ− ( )1 2ωρ= − .  Assumption 1 requires 2 1mγ < . 
Hence, if ( )1 2ω ≤  it is immediate from (26) that ( )* 0idq dρ >  for all [ ]0,1ρ ∈ , and hence part 
(i) follows.  For part (ii), note that ( )( ) ( )( )1 1m n n nωρ= − − + .  Hence, again from (26): 
 ( ) ( ){ } ( )
*
2
23 1 4 1 1 ; 1
T
idq Hn n m n
d D n
γ ωρω γρ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ = Τ − − − − + Τ ≡ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  (27) 
Since [ ]2 0,1mγ ∈ , it is immediately apparent that ( )*
0
0idq d ρρ = >  and ( )* 1 0idq d ρρ = <  
provided ( ) ( )( )( )* 3 1 4 1n nω ω≥ = − − , where * 1ω <  for 3n > .  Hence, for 3n > , 0γ > , 
( )*
1
0idq d ρρ = <  provided *ω ω≥ .  The optimal IPR protection, ( ) ( )( )( )* 3 1 4 1n nρ ω≤ − −  , is 
less than 1, completing the proof of part (ii).   
Finally, suppose:  ( )1i iω ω λ= +  such that:  
2
0
n
i
i
λ
=
=∑ .  Then (26) can be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }{ }* 2 23 1 4 1 1 1 2 1i idq n n m n n n n m nd ρω γ λ ωρ γρ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= Τ − − − − + + + − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠    (28) 
Rewrite (28) as: 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2* 2 1 1 113 1 4 1 1 1
2 2
iii
n n mndq n n m n
d
λ γλρω γρ
⎧ ⎫+ − ++⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤= Τ − − − − + + −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
  (29) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“appropriateness” of the innovation for each country. 
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Define aρ  as the optimal IPR protection for the country with the average spillover rate ( )0iλ = .  
Since the last term on the RHS of (29) is negative, it immediately follows that 
*
0
a
idq
d ρρ >
⎛ ⎞ ≤⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 as 
0iλ <≥ , which completes the proof of part(iii). QED 
Several points need to be made concerning this agreement of southern countries to 
willingly impose IPR protection.  First, it remains true that any particular member would be 
better off abandoning the agreement and ending all IPR protection provided it believes the other 
members will maintain the agreement.  However, if it believes that its exit from the agreement 
will lead to a collapse of the agreement (and all countries abandoning IPR protection), then the 
agreement will be self-enforcing if all countries are identical.  Secondly, however, if countries 
differ and if the IPR protection rate is set at the optimal level for the average member, then 
countries with lower imitation abilities may be better off quitting the agreement even if that leads 
to the collapse of the agreement.  Hence, to ensure that it is in the self-interest of these lower 
imitation ability countries to remain in the agreement, the coalition might have to settle for 
weaker IPR protection then its average member wants.  Finally, then, it may be the case that - if a 
low imitation ability country opts out of the agreement - then the remaining countries (assumed 
identical) may choose a stricter level of IPR protection13. 
Finally, we could ask how these results would change if the southern countries also 
consumed the good.  As discussed earlier, relaxing IPR protection has ambiguous affects on 
world output (price), and hence on consumer surplus; when the overall level of spillovers is large, 
                                                          
13We cannot be sure that eliminating a low ability country from the agreement will increase IPR protection for two 
reasons.  First, since the original group was heterogeneous, we need to specify how an agreement was reached.  
Secondly, even though the exit of the low ability country raises the average imitation ability of the remaining 
countries - which leaders to stricter IPR protection - it also reduces the number of countries in the coalition, which 
reduces the desired IPR protection.  Overall, the impact can be ambiguous.   
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further relaxation of IPR protection lowers output and consumer surplus, while for low levels of 
spillovers, relaxing IPR protection may increase world output.   
Since we have shown that, absent domestic consumption, an individual southern country 
has no incentive to offer any IPR protection, adding domestic consumption may not alter this 
result at all, and the precise impact will depend upon how large the domestic market share is.  
Rather than consider all such cases, let us restrict attention to the case where the southern 
countries collective choose an IPR policy (as in Proposition 4).  Then, using (17), (29) and (18): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
21 2*
*
2
1 2 1
;
1 1 1 1
j
jj
j T
dqdW dQ dQQ q
d d d d n
β γ βγχθρ ρ ρ β β γ β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ − − −⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ − − −⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
   (30) 
Assuming all southern countries choose the same IPR policy and have the same imitation ability: 
 ( )1 1
1
n
n
ωρβ + −= +
 ;  and ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22 1 1 2 11 2 1 1n m nnωρ γβ γ β ⎛ ⎞− − − +− − − = ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠   (31) 
By definition, ( ) ( )1Td d nβ ρ ω= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  As earlier, let aρ  represent the solution to (27), which 
represents the optimal IPR policy if countries are alike and there is no domestic consumption.  
From (30) and (31) it is immediately clear that ( ) 0adQ d ρρ < .  Hence: 
 
Proposition 5:  Assume all Southern countries are identical and that they collectively choose 
their IPR policy.  Then, as their share of world consumption increases, their collectively optimal 
IPR policy becomes more restrictive (i.e., ( )( ) 0a jd dρ θ θ < ) 
Proof: 
 Define ( )aρ θ as the collective policy that maximizes ( )2 2*2
j
j
Q qθ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  where all southern 
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countries are identical ( ), 2,...,j S j sq q j nθ θ= = ∀ =  As shown above, ( )( ) 0adQ dρ θ <  at 
0sθ = .  Assuming the second order conditions (SOCs) hold, this implies that at ( ) , 0,aρ θ θ >  
( ) ( )0j a adq d dQ dρ ρ> > .  From (30),  this implies that ( ) ( )2 0ajW ρ θρ θ∂ ∂ ∂ < .  Applying the 
SOCs again leads to the conclusion ( )( ) 0ad dρ θ θ < , as stated in the proposition. QED 
 
 However, even though the southern countries would - if acting collectively - choose some 
IPR protection, that does not mean all conflict between north and south has been eliminated.  In 
particular, it is apparent that: 
 
Corollary 5.1:  The optimal IPR protection level for the north is stricter than the collective rate 
chosen by the south ( ) ( )N aρ ρ θ< .   
Corollary 5.2: Assume southern countries must use the same IPR policy.  Then the IPR policy 
that maximizes world welfare is in the open interval ( ),N aρ ρ  
 
 Corollary 5.1 follows immediately from the facts that the northern firm’s profits are a 
decreasing function of ρ  and that consumer surplus is also a decreasing function of ρ  at aρ .  
Corollary 5.2 follows from the fact that maximizing world welfare means maximizing the sum of 
northern and southern welfare.  Both corollaries, of course, assume the SOCs hold. 
 Thus far, we have assumed that the southern countries can coordinate their IPR policy but 
have implicitly assumed that no transfers could take place among them.  In order to consider the 
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role of diversity among these countries, assume that transfers are feasible and that policy is 
coordinated in order to maximize the surplus of all southern countries.  Hence, define: 
 2
2 2
n n
s
i i
i i
W qπ
= =
= =∑ ∑  (32) 
 Furthermore, using (3),  (4), (5), and (9): 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
1 2 1 2 1* * *
2
1
; ;
1 1 1i i i i i i
A n mAq
n n m
γ α εα ε β β γχ β ω ρ γχ γ
− − +−⎛ ⎞= − + − ≡ =⎜ ⎟+ + −⎝ ⎠

  (33) 
Assuming a common IPR policy, differences in spillovers reflect differences in imitation ability 
( )iω .  Since we are interested in variation among the southern countries, define:   
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2*
2 2
1 ; 1 ; ;
n n
T T
i i j i i i i i j
j j
n nϕ ε ε δ ω ω σ ϕ δ ρ γχ ω ω
= =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤≡ − − ≡ − − ≡ + ≡⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ∑    (34) 
From earlier definitions we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2
1 2
2 1
0 ;
1 1 1
T TTn n
j j i i i
j j
n
n n n
ω ρ ω ρβε ε ε β β δ ρ δ ρ
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟= → = − − = − − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑  (35) 
 Note that positive values of both iϕ  and iδ  correspond to situations in which that country’s costs 
lie above the average for southern countries.  Using (33), (34) and (35): 
 ( ) ( )1 2* *1 22 1; 1 1
T
i S i S
nAq q q
n n
ω ρασ ε γχ⎛ ⎞− −−⎛ ⎞= − = + + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (36) 
Hence, using (36), rewrite (32) as: 
 ( ) ( )1 22 2 2 2 * 2 *,
2 2 2 2
; 2
n n n n
s
S i S i i
i i i i
W q q V Cov Vϕ δ ϕ δσ σ σ ρ γχ ρ γχ
= = = =
= − = + = + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (37) 
In (37), by construction, 
2
0,
n
i
i
σ
=
=∑  and we define: 
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 ( )2 2,
2 2 2
0; ; 0
n n n
i i i i
i i i
V Cov Vϕ δ ϕ δϕ ϕ δ δ
= = =
≡ > ≡ ≡ >∑ ∑ ∑  (38) 
Next, consider the cooperative IPR policy that maximizes southern welfare: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2*
1 2*
,2
2 2 1 2
1
T Ts
T
S
ndW q Cov V
d n δ ϕ δ
γχ ω ψ ω ρ ρ γχ ψ ρωρ ψ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤+ − −⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= + + −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 (39) 
If Tω is sufficiently small, there is no interior solution and * 1ρ = ; however, for Tω  large enough, 
the south benefits from adopting a common IPR policy ( )* 1ρ < .  Using (37) and (39) we have: 
 
Proposition 6:  Assume the southern countries adopt a common IPR policy to maximize 
aggregate welfare (profits) and that transfers among countries are feasible.  Then: 
i. Southern welfare is increasing in the heterogeneity of its members – given average 
intrinsic cost and imitation ability, greater cost variability implies higher Southern profits.  
This implies southern welfare is increasing in the variance of instrinsic costs ( )ϕ , in the 
variance of imitation ability ( )ϕ  and in the covariance between these variables. 
ii.  Assuming an interior solution for IPR policy, if ( )1 2*,Cov Vδ ϕ δρ γχ⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  is positive 
(negative), then increases in the variance of imitation ability or in the covariance between 
disadvantages in intrinsic costs and in imitation ability lead to tighter (looser) optimal 
IPR policy. 
 
PROOF:  Part (i) follows immediately from (37).  For part (ii), note that an interior solution 
requires ( ) 0Tψ ρω− <  since, if ( ) 0Tψ ρω− ≥  then the first term on the RHS of (39) is strictly 
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positive, while the second is non-negative, implying that welfare is increasing in ρ  at the point14.  
Given the second order conditions, part (ii) follows immediate from ( ) 0Tψ ρω− < . QED 
 
 It is well-known that, given a fixed number of firms with constant marginal costs, and 
given the average (marginal) cost of this set, that aggregate profits increase as the variance of 
costs increase.  Since positive values of ϕ  represent intrinsic costs above average, and positive 
values of δ  represent a firm with below average imitation ability (hence, higher than average 
costs), it is clear that aggregate profits are increasing in the covariance of these two variables, as 
well as in their individual variances.  It is also sensible to expect these variables to be positively 
correlated as higher costs are likely to reflect lower productivities and less likelihood the country 
can benefit from northern innovations.  The second part, that greater heterogeneity in the 
membership leads to stricter IPR policy is less intuitive but essentially reflects the fact that, with 
more diversity, there is a greater payoff to reducing (average) marginal costs.  From a policy 
perspective, this would seem to imply that allowing some countries to opt out of an IPR 
agreement may not be in the interests of either the north or of the remaining southern countries.   
 Finally, it should be clear that, regardless of whether the objective is maximizing the 
welfare of the southern countries or world welfare (again, assuming transfers are feasible), that a 
common IPR policy can never be optimal.  The equilibrium R&D rate depends on the 
aggregate spillover rate, Tβ , and not on the vector of spillovers.  Hence, it follows that one can 
think of the optimization process as a two stage process: (1)for any given Tβ , choose country-
                                                          
14 Even if ( )1 2*, 0Cov Vδ ϕ δρ γχ⎡ ⎤+ <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , upon regrouping the expression in (39), the term multiplying ( )Tψ ρω−  
must be positive. 
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level spillovers (R&D policy) to maximize world welfare (or southern profits); and (2)choose the 
optimal Tβ .  From (18), (19) and (22) we can write aggregate welfare as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2*
2 22* 2 * *
1
2 2
1 ;
2
n n
T
i S i
i i
Q
W q n q qσ χ
= =
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= Ω+ = Ω+ − + Ω ≡ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑  (40) 
In (40), note that Ω , as defined, and Sq  depend only on Tβ , where Sq  is defined in (36) with 
( )Tω ρ  replaced by:  ( )
2
1
n
T
i
i
β β
=
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .  Also, iσ  is defined as in (34): 
 ( )( ) ( )1 2 2* 1; 1 1
n
j T
j S
i i i i i i in n
β βσ ϕ δ γχ δ β β β β=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟≡ + ≡ − = − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
 (41) 
Note that Sβ  is the average spillover rate among southern countries and the domain of  
[ ]0,i iβ ω∈  implies ,S Si iδ β ω β⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦ .    Constrained optimality (i.e., given Tβ ) entails 
choosing { }2 ,..., nδ δ  to maximize 2
2
n
i
i
σ
=
∑  subject to the domain restrictions on iδ  and the 
condition that 
2
0
n
i
i
δ
=
=∑ .  Clearly, the objective function is not concave and the corresponding 
solution will be a corner solution.  Further, the integer programming nature of the problem 
makes it difficult to fully characterize the solution.  Nevertheless, we have: 
 
Proposition 7:  Given the intrinsic cost differences ( )iϕ  and imitation rates ( )iω  of each firm 
(country), suppose the Southern countries jointly pick a distinct IPR policy [ ]( )0,1iρ ∈  for each 
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country to maximize their aggregate welfare, given that aggregate spillovers are fixed 
2
1
n
T
i i
i
ω ρ β
=
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .  Then the optimal IPR policy has the following properties: 
i. All countries, except at most one, will have a corner solution with 0iρ =  or 1iρ = .   
ii. Assume the optimal solution implies * 1sρ =  for country s, characterized by intrinsic costs 
and imitation rates ( ),s sϕ ω ; then it is also optimal that * 1jρ =  for any country j such that:  
( )( )0,j s j sMinϕ ϕ μ ω ω< + − .  
iii. Assume the optimal solution implies * 0kρ =  for country k, characterized by intrinsic 
costs and imitation rates ( ),k kϕ ω ; then it is also optimal that * 0tρ =  for any country t 
such that:  ( )( )0,t k t kMaxϕ ϕ μ ω ω> + − . 
 
PROOF:  See appendix. 
 
 Because of the nature of the problem, it is not possible to fully characterize the solution.  
Nevertheless, the “spirit” of the solution is intuitive.  If it is optimal for a given country to have a 
completely lax IPR policy, then it should also be optimal for a “more efficient” country to have 
the same policy – that is, for any country with lower intrinsic costs and higher assimilation 
ability.  Similarly, if the optimal solution entails no spillovers for a given country, then the same 
logic implies less efficient countries should also adopt a no spillover/strict IPR policy.  The 
following corollaries follow immediately from Proposition 7:    
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Corollary 7.1:  Suppose all countries have the same intrinsic costs ( )0i iϕ ≡ ∀ .  Without loss of 
generality order countries so that: 2 3 ... nω ω ω> > > .  Given Tβ ,  define j  such that:  
( )1
2 2
1
j j
T
i i
i i
ω β ω
−
= =
< − ≤∑ ∑ .  Then the optimal solution entails * 1iρ =  for i=2,..,(,j-1;) * 0kρ =  for 
( )1,...,k j n= +   and [ ]* 0,1jρ ∈ . 
 
Corollary 7.2:  Suppose all countries have the same assimilation ability ( )i iω ω≡ ∀ .  Without 
loss of generality order countries so that:  2 3 ... nφ φ φ< < < .  For given Tβ  define j to be the 
largest integer no larger than ( )1Tβ ω ω⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦ 15.  Then the optimal solution entails * 1iρ =  for 
i=2,..,(,j); * 0kρ =  for k=(j+2),…,n; and [ ]* 1 0,1jρ + ∈ . 
 
 These results are much like the results of a Ricardian trade model with many countries 
and two goods; that is, when there is heterogeneity in only one dimension then it is much easier 
to characterize the results.  Finally, since the countries can differ in these two dimensions 
(intrinsic costs and assimilation ability) the obvious question is whether the distribution of these 
attributes across countries matters.  For this we have: 
 
Proposition 8: Consider the vectors of attributes, ( )2 3, ,..., nϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ=G  and ( )2 3, ,..., nω ω ω ω=G , 
where ( ),j jϕ ω  represents the instrinsic costs, and imitation ability, of country j.  Suppose for 
any pair of countries, k and j, we have j kϕ ϕ<  and j kω ω< .  Consider a rearrangement of the 
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vector ωG  to ω′G  where t tω ω′ =  for all , ;t j k≠  and j kω ω′ =  and k jω ω′ = .  Then, given Tβ ,  the 
aggregate maximized welfare of Southern countries with vector pair ( ),ϕ ω′G G  will be no smaller 
(and can be  strictly larger) then with vector pair ( ),ϕ ω .  In words, welfare will be higher (no 
lower) when countries with low intrinsic costs also have high imitation abilities. 
 
Proof:  See appendix.    
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated welfare effects of spillovers due to relaxed IPR protection. 
Unlike previous studies in which two countries, North and South, are modeled, we consider a 
situation where there are many southern countries.  We allow these Southern countries to differ 
in two attributes, their intrinsic costs and their ability to absorb foreign technology.  Using this 
framework we reach a number of important results.  First, we find, like others, that while there is 
North-South conflict over IPR protection, the heterogeneity of the model makes it apparent that 
there can also be conflict among the Southern countries themselves.  We show, for example, that 
an increase in spillovers (a decrease in IPR protection) in any one Southern country will not only 
hurt the innovating North, but will also hurt those Southern countries which have a significant 
ability to absorb foreign technology.  We also show, assuming all output is exported to the North, 
that the non-cooperative equilibrium in which each Southern country sets its own IPR policy 
leads to maximum spillovers (no protection).  However, if the Southern countries can 
cooperatively set policy, even without pressure from the North, then it will be in their collective 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 The idea, of course, is if the maximum spillover is to be ( )1Tβ −  then no more then ( )1TInt β ω⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  countries 
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interests to provide some IPR protection, and the resulting equilibrium will be Pareto superior to 
the non-cooperative equilibrium, provided Southern countries are sufficiently homogeneous.   
However, even when the policy is set cooperatively, there will be disagreements among 
the Southern countries if they are heterogeneous.  The countries with the higher ability to absorb 
Northern innovation will prefer stricter IPR policy then will those countries with lesser imitation 
ability.  This result sounds reminiscent of WTO agreements in which low income countries are, 
at least initially, excluded from the IPR agreements.  However, since Northern innovation 
depends upon a measure of total protection, and not on how it is distributed across individual 
nations, somewhat paradoxically welfare will be higher when it is countries with lower intrinsic 
cost and higher imitation ability that are excluded from this IPR agreement then when the less 
efficient Southern countries are excluded.   
 There are some possible extensions of this study. How much each country absorbs the 
knowledge or information from another country depends on its ability to realize knowledge 
spillovers. Thus, it will be interesting to introduce endogenous spillovers by having a cost 
function:  ),( αμβ iii  where μ i  is the cost of reverse-engineering and iα  is a country-specific 
parameter. Given a vector of α , we could model the “spillover” decision without IPR and then 
have IPR shift the cost function. Second, the existence of spillovers may increase the northern 
firm’s incentive to sell its innovations to the southern countries. Thus, the issue of licensing may 
be an important topic for future research. Third, it would be worthwhile extending the model to 
consider the appropriateness of the Northern technology, and in a heterogeneous Southern 
environment investigate how IPR policy adopted by Southern countries interacts with the type of 
technology decisions pursued by the North.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
can have maximal spillovers.  Since the index set for countries starts at i=2, we add 1 to this number.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
We must show that, given Assumption 1:  
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n
ψ ββ +< +  where: 
0
1
1
n
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k i
k
β β β β
=
≡ = + +∑ ;  
   0
1,
n
k
k i
β β
≠
≡ ∑ ; and: 0* 11 1
T
i
n n
β βββ + +≡ =+ +  .  Also: 
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
22 * *2
22 2 *
1 1 1 11
1 1 1
nn
n
β γ βγψ γ γ β
⎡ ⎤ + − − −Δ + − Δ⎣ ⎦≡ =⎡ ⎤+ + Δ + −⎣ ⎦
.  Simplifying, this implies demonstrating: 
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2
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2
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0; 1 ; 1
1 1
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n m
γψ β β β βγ
−⎡ ⎤+≡ − = + − > ≡ − ≡ −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
 
  
By construction, 0H >  for i Tm m≥  (as existence requires ( )21 0Tmγ− > ).  Also: 
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1
i T
i i
d dm
dm dm n
β = − → = + .  Thus: 
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( )
( )
( )
2 2 2
22 2
1 3 2 11
1 11 1
T T T
i T T
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γ γ γ
γ γ
⎧ ⎫− −⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞= − +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟+ ++⎝ ⎠ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
Define ( )2Tmτ γ=  and simplifying the above expression yields: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( )
2
2 2
1 1 3 1 2 1 2 1
0
1 1 1 1i
ndH n
dm n n
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ
⎧ ⎫ ⎛ ⎞+ + − + − − −⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞= = >⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ + + +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭ ⎝ ⎠
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as existence requires ( )21 0Tmγ− > .  Thus, the minimum value of H for i Tm m<  occurs at 
0im = :  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
2 2
1 1
0
1 1
T T T T
i
T T
m n m m m NH m
m m
γ γ
γ γ
⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦= = ≡+ +   where N represents the term in brackets in 
the numerator and sign( ( )0iH m = )=sign(N).  At 0iβ = , [ ]0 01 ; 0, 21Tm nn
β β+= ∈ −+ .  Since N  is 
decreasing in Tm , and 
1
1T
nm
n
−⎛ ⎞≤ ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ , 
21n
n
γ +⎛ ⎞≤ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  this implies: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 111 1 1 1 01
n nnN n n n
n n
γ⎡ ⎤ + −⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞≥ − − + ≥ − − >⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
.   
Thus 0H >  for all [ ]0,1iβ ∈  given Assumption 1.        QED 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
 
A choice of an IPR policy ( )* *2 ,..., nρ ρ  is equivalent to a choice of spillovers ( )* *2 ,..., nβ β  such 
that [ ]0,i iβ ω∈ .  To compare policies that have the same impact on R&D, aggregate output and 
price requires that ( )
2
1
n
T
i
i
β β
=
= −∑ .  Constrained maximization of welfare is then equivalent to 
maximizing 2
2
n
i
i
σ
=
∑ , where  i i s iσ ε β μ β μ⎡ ⎤≡ + −⎣ ⎦  where, for simplicity, we define ( )1 2μ γχ= .  
Assume ( )* *2 ,..., nβ β  is the optimal solution to this problem and consider any variation to 
*
i i iβ β η= + .  For this variation to satisfy the spillover constraint, 
2
0
n
i
i
η
=
=∑ ; for it to satisfy the 
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restrictions on domain, * *,i i i iη β ω β⎡ ⎤∈ − −⎣ ⎦ .  If *β
G
 is optimal then the following inequality has to 
hold for all feasible ηG : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 2 * 2 *
2 2
, 2 0
n n
i i i i i i s i i
i i
V η β σ β σ β μη φ μ β β μη
= =
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ − = + − − ≥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑GG   (A1) 
 
To prove part (i), assume there exist ( ) ( )* *0, , 0,i i j jβ ω β ω∈ ∈ ; let 0 ,k k i jη = ∀ ≠  and let 
j iη η= − .  See * *,i jβ β  are interior, iη , if sufficiently small, can take on positive or negative 
values.  Using these assumptions (A1) simplifies to: 
 
 ( ) ( )2 * *2 2 ;i i i i i i j jV K Kμη μη φ μβ φ μβ⎡ ⎤= − ≡ − − −⎣ ⎦  (A2) 
 
But it is apparent that there exist feasible values of iη  such that 0V < .  Thus. if 0,iK > choose 
0;iη <  if 0iK <  choose 0iη > ; and if 0iK =  any small variation in iη  will suffice.  But 0V <  
contradicts the assumption that both  * *,i jβ β  are optimal and interior.   
 Given part (i), it immediately follows that the solution can be characterized by dividing 
the set of countries into 3 sets:  for countries in set I, * 1;iρ =  for countries in set II, * 0jρ = ; and 
there is at most one country such that ( )* 0,1kρ ∈ . 
 To prove part (ii), assume ( )* *1s s sρ β ω= =  and take any country j and assume * 0jρ = .  
Consider a variation to β  which changes spillovers only for countries s and j.  In particular, 
using the earlier notation, let ( ),j j sMinη ω ω=  and s jη η= − .  This choice is feasible because the 
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sum of spillovers is preserved and since, after the variation, ( ) 0;s s jβ ω η= − ≥  j j jβ η ω= ≤  
(note that 0jη <  would not be feasible).  Following our earlier procedure, with this variation we 
have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 2 * 2
2
, 2
n
i i i i j j s s j
i
V η β σ β σ β μη φ φ μω μη
=
⎡ ⎤≡ − = − + −⎣ ⎦∑GG    (A3) 
But, if ( ) ( )( ), ,0j s s j s s j sMin Minφ φ μω μ ω ω φ μ ω ω< − + = + −  then 0V < , contradicting the 
assumption of optimality.  Hence, if * 1sρ =  and ( )( ),0j s j sMinφ φ μ ω ω< + − , then * 1jρ = .  That 
completes the proof of part (ii) 
 Part (iii) is proved in the same manor.  Assume * 0kρ =  and take any other country t, and 
assume * 1tρ =  .  Consider any variation ( ),t t kMinη ω ω= −  and let k tη η= − .  This variation 
guarantees aggregate spillovers are unchanged and all domain constraints are satisfied.  Again, 
calculate the change in welfare associated with this change: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 2 * 2
2
, 2
n
i i i i t t k t t
i
V η β σ β σ β μη φ φ μω μη
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ − = − − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∑GG   (A4) 
If 0V < , then the original program cannot have been optimal; given 0tη <  then: 
 ( )( )0 ,0t k t t k t kV Maxφ φ μω μη φ μ ω ω< ↔ > + + = + −  (A5) 
Hence, if the inequality is satisfied then * *0 0k tρ ρ= → = , proving part (iii).  QED 
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